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Eastern enlargement of the EU is a central pillar in Europes post-Cold
War architecture. Keeping the eastern countries out seriously endangers their
economic transition, and economic failure in the east could threaten peace and
prosperity in western Europe. The perceived economic costs and benets will
dictate the enlargements timing. There are four parts to the calculus   the
costs and the benets in the east and in the west. Here we break new ground
in estimating the economic benets of enlargement for east and west using
simulations in a global applied general equilibrium model. Our analysis
includes a scenario in which joining the EU signicantly reduces the risk
premium on investment in the east   with resulting huge benets to the new
entrants. We also review the existing literature on the EU budget costs and
arrive at a surprisingly well-determined consensus estimate, which we
support with a new political economy analysis of the budget. The bottom line
is unambiguous and strongly positive: enlargement is a very good deal for both
the EU incumbents and the new members.
 Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph F. Francois and Richard Portes
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1. INTRODUCTION
Just one decade ago, millions of men and trillions of dollars of equipment stood
ready for combat in Europe. The demise of the political systems in eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union defused the situation. This political creative destruction
opened the door to great opportunities, but also to great dangers. On the bright
side, a continuing success story in eastern Europe will lock in democracy and pro-
market reforms. Moreover, a hundred million eastern consumers with rising
incomes are a bonanza for western European businesses. Continuing economic
success in the east will foster prosperity and peace throughout the continent. On the
dark side, however, stagnant or falling incomes and impoverishment of a large slice
of the population could foster widespread disillusionment with market economics
and democracy. Most worrying of all is that this may occur while a power vacuum
exists in central Europe.
Geography and history make these continent-wide problems. Even without
speaking of war, any serious unrest or conict   even if it were limited to the east 
could harm western Europe via mass migrations, increased defence expenditures
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and changes in investors attitudes. In short, economic failure in the east could
threaten peace and prosperity in western Europe.
There is, fortunately, a simple way simultaneously to ensure the bright-side
economic outcome and to alleviate the power vacuum  enlarge the European
Union to include the ten central and eastern European countries (CEECs): the
Visegrad-5 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Poland), the
Balkan-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Baltic-3 (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).
In this sense, eastern enlargement is a central pillar in Europes post-Cold War
architecture. Western European politicians have the power to meet this historic
challenge, but contemplation of the economic and nancial costs of doing so has led
them to procrastinate. In other words, geopolitical considerations constitute the
engine driving enlargement, but the economic and nancial considerations
constitute the brake. This paper looks at the economic costs and benets of
admitting the CEECs into the EU.
There are four parts to the calculus   the costs and the benets in the east and the
costs and the benets in the west. Unfortunately, efforts to date have been directed
almost exclusively to the costs to the EU budget of an eastern enlargement.
Moreover, there is a widely held belief that even this limited debate has been
inconclusive. For instance, the Financial Times (16 December 1996) quotes an MEP
with a leading role in the enlargement debate, Mr Arie Oostlander, as saying that
the wildest rumours were circulating about the cost of enlargement, while the
reality was that adequate reliable information is not currently available. One of
the contributions of this article is to argue that a sober evaluation of the literature
shows that there is a relatively narrow range of estimates for the budget cost of
enlargement. Moreover, this range is quite low compared to the early estimates that
stimulated much thinking on the enlargement issue. We believe the estimates below
are fairly reliable and indeed adequate for an overall assessment of the economic
impact of enlargement.
A second contribution of this article is to ll in two more parts of the calculus: the
economic benets for the east and the west. The nal part   the cost of enlargement
for the east   seems to defy calculation. The main issue here concerns the extent to
which adoption of the European Unions body of legislation and case law  the
acquis   will stunt eastern growth and raise unemployment rates. After all, the EUs
rules were designed for rich social democracies with extensive social security systems.
They are thus unlikely to be appropriate for poorer but rapidly growing eastern
nations. Imagine what would have happened if Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong had
been forced to adopt Social Charter rules and EU environmental standards at a
comparable stage of their development. The CEECs do need market economy rules,
and there is some merit to adopting pre-set rules like the acquis, but the acquis is
surely a sub-optimal set of rules for nations in the midst of their take-off stage of
growth (see Smith et al., 1995). Quantifying such costs is important, but seemingly
impossible.
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The paper is organized in four sections after the introduction. The next section
provides an overview of the basic structure of the eastern and western European
economies. These facts are essential to understanding our numerical assessment of
the economic benets of eastern enlargement. Section 3 presents a global applied
general equilibrium model, which is used to simulate the economic impact of an
eastern enlargement. The model produces results for all regions, but we focus on the
effects on the CEECs, the EU and the EFTA nations. Section 4 reviews the
extensive literature on the EU budget costs of an eastern enlargement and arrives at
our consensus estimate of the costs. The nal section presents a summary and our
concluding remarks.
2. THE BASIC ECONOMIC FACTS
2.1. Relative size: big west and small east
The current front-runners in the eastern enlargement race are the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic (although human rights issues
threaten to disqualify the latter from the race). Even these front-runners, however,
are quite different economically from the EU15, as Table 1 shows. For instance, the
EU15 are on average half as agricultural and two and a half times richer than the
Visegrad-5. The much lower per capita income in the CEECs reects (by denition)
a much lower labour productivity. A good part of this difference is accounted for by
the inferior state of eastern capital stocks and technology. Such factors can be
changed rapidly, since installing new machines and adopting new technology are
relatively simple, given the high level of education in the CEECs. Another part
depends upon much more intangible factors, such as a well-functioning public
administration, respect and knowledge of commercial law and job-specic training
of workers. Since these intangibles are in good shape in some CEECs (e.g., the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic), but
in bad shape in others, the CEECs are likely to have very different growth rates in
the coming decades. For instance, for the Visegrad-5 and Estonia, the prospects of
rapid investment in physical and knowledge capital lead most observers to predict
growth rates that are two or three times those of western Europe. This growth gap
will narrow income differentials, but it will still take decades before even the richest
CEECs catch up to the EU15 average.
Differences between the CEEC and EU populations, multiplied by the income-
level differences, imply that the two regions are of very unequal economic size. The
Visegrad-5 economies taken together, for instance, amount to only about 5% of the
EU15 economy. The relative size is important for a fairly simple reason. Inter-
national integration boosts incomes by expanding the set of opportunities facing
consumers and rms. Typically, this expansion of opportunity enables consumers
and rms to arrange their affairs more efciently, which results in higher output and
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income. Eastwest integration in Europe will plainly expand the CEECs
opportunities much more than it will expand those of the EU, so we should expect
the integration to have a larger percentage impact on the GDP of the CEECs, even
without undertaking any formal estimates.
2.2. Trade
The EU15 sell about $40 billion to the CEECs and buy slightly less from them. This
trade covers a broad range of goods and consists mainly of two-way trade in similar
products, as Figure 1 shows. With the exceptions of chemicals and rubber and
plastic goods, and capital goods (transport equipment and other machines and
equipment) where the EU is a net exporter, the EUCEEC trade is approximately
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Table 1. Basic economic facts
1994 1993 
export shares to:
Population Real Agriculture
(m) per capita GDP CEECs EU
GNP share (%) (%)
(US$) (%)
Czech Republic 10 8990 6 63
Hungary 10 6080 7 55
Poland 38 5480 6 63
Slovak Republic 5 6290 7 53
Slovenia 2 6230 5 n.a.
Visegrad-5 66 6207 6
Bulgaria 9 4380 13 39
Romania 23 4090 21 49
CEEC7 98 5547 9
Greece 10 10 930 16 13 57
Portugal 10 11 970 4 1 80
Ireland 4 13 550 8 2 72
Spain 39 13 740 3 2 73
UK 58 17 970 2 2 58
Finland 5 16 750 5 11 55
Italy 57 18 460 3 5 57
Netherlands 15 18 750 3 3 74
Belgium 10 20 270 2 3 75
France 58 19 670 2 2 64
Austria 8 19 560 2 11 65
Germany 82 19 480 1 8 57
Sweden 9 17 130 2 3 55
Denmark 5 19 880 4 4 61
Luxembourg 0.4 35 860 n.a. n.a. n.a.
EU15 369 16 164 3 4 63
Sources:  Population and real GNP/pop. (PPP estimates 1994 Intl US$s) World
Development Report, 1996, table 1. Agriculture GDP share, World Development Report,
1996, table 12. Trade data from WTO database, using WTO denition of CEECs.
Notes:  Belgium trade data include Luxembourg. EU trade data for 1994.
balanced product by product. With this sort of trade structure, reciprocal liberaliz-
ation can force sectors to expand in both regions due to improved exploitation of
scale economies. At the same time, the relatively unbalanced nature of trade in
capital goods points to the potential for signicant enlargement-related restructuring
in the CEECs that is heavily biased against capital goods.
The EU15s trade with the CEECs is distributed in a very disproportionate
manner. Germany alone accounts for 42% of EU15 exports to the CEECs, while no
other member state accounts for more than 10% of the EU15 total. Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK each account for 5%
or more of the total. At the other extreme, the exports of Portugal and Ireland to the
CEECs account for less than 2% of the EU total.
The last salient point concerns the disparity between the importance of the EU
market for CEEC exports and the importance of the CEEC markets for EU
exporters. Comparing the last two columns of Table 1, we see that the EU market is
critical to CEEC exports, amounting to 5060% of all exports (approximately the
importance of the EU market for EU nations themselves). However, the CEEC
market is fairly unimportant to the EU exporters, with the CEECs taking in about
4% of EU15 exports (including intra-EU trade). While the welfare gains from trade
generally stem from imports rather than exports, national trade policies are typically
inuenced by mercantilist concerns. It is therefore useful to note that the average
EU gure of 4% hides a good deal of dispersion. For Germany, Austria, Greece and
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Figure 1. EUCEEC trade, 1993 (US$bn)
Source: WTO database.
Finland the gure is at least double the 4% average, but for Portugal, Ireland, Spain
and the UK, the CEEC markets are only half as important as the EU average.
2.3. Protection
The nal set of basic facts concerns the level of trade barriers in the CEECs and the
EU. Due to the Europe Agreements, the EU has phased out all statutory tariffs on
CEEC industrial goods, and the CEECs are in the process of phasing out the same
on imports from the EU (Faini and Portes, 1995). Note that duty-free treatment of
industrial goods is not really preferential in Europe, since about 80% of EU imports
are accorded such status. In other words, zero statutory tariffs merely level the
playing eld for Europes major suppliers. Moreover, zero statutory tariffs do not
mean free trade. EU-imposed anti-dumping duties and price-xing arrangements,
meant to avoid such duties, greatly restrict CEEC exports in those areas in which
they could expand sales most rapidly   iron and steel in particular. The EU also
continues to impose quotas on other so-called sensitive industrial goods, such as
textiles, clothing and footwear. CEEC exports of non-industrial goods  especially
agricultural goods  have been liberalized only slightly by the EU, and there are no
concrete plans to liberalize such trade prior to enlargement.
Figure 2 shows the MFN applied tariff rates for the EU and the CEECs for a
range of products. There are three main points to be highlighted. First, the CEECs
are on average more protectionist than the EU, although both are quite open when
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Figure 2. Post-Uruguay Round applied MFN tariff rates
Source: World Bank, Finger et al., 1996.
compared to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America: the CEECs
average applied tariff is 6.5%, while the EUs is 3%. Second, the CEECs average of
6.5% consists of somewhat higher-than-EU rates on industrial goods, but much
lower-than-EU rates on agricultural goods. As a result, the enlargement is likely to
lead to an important increase in CEEC agricultural protection against third-country
suppliers. The same sort of pattern emerged with the Iberian accession, and in that
instance third countries, notably the USA, demanded compensation for the hikes in
farm protection. The last point is that the gap between the CEEC and EU rates
varies widely among industrial goods. For instance, the gap is more than 10% in
transport equipment, but less than 2% in textiles and clothing, petroleum and
mineral products.
This asymmetry of protection rates has important implications for the welfare
effects of enlargement. Since two-thirds of CEEC imports are from the EU, and this
trade will become free, the ongoing process of joining the EU implies a great deal of
tariff cutting in the CEECs, but very little tariff cutting in the EU (especially since
imports from the CEECs amount to only 4% of EU15 imports). Because most gains
come from own-liberalization, the initial levels of protection suggest that enlargement
will lead to much greater income gains in the CEECs than in the EU. At the same
time, like the pattern of trade, the pattern of protection also suggests that negative
restructuring in the CEECs will probably be concentrated in heavy industry.
3. MEASURING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS
The preferential integration of two regions can produce a vast array of economic
effects. No longer is it enough to think about trade creation and trade diversion:
the last ten years have seen important theoretical advances in this area.1 Since our
results depend heavily on effects that may not be familiar to non-specialists, section
3.1 provides intuition for the new effects and their relationship with older, more
standard effects. Section 3.2 briey presents how we capture all of the various effects
of eastern enlargement on the CEEC and EU economies. Section 3.3 discusses the
policy experiments and results for the EU as a whole when we make conservative
assumptions. Section 3.4 makes less conservative assumptions, while the nal section
presents some rough calculations on how the gains will be distributed among the
incumbent EU15.
3.1. A primer on the theory of preferential trade liberalization
A useful classication divides all effects into allocation or accumulation effects (an
alternative, but misleading, dichotomy is static and dynamic effects). Allocation
EU ENLARGEMENT 133
1 See Baldwin and Venables (1995) for a survey and synthesis of such effects.
effects capture the way in which integration induces changes in economic efciency
through resource and expenditure reallocation. Even if we ignore imperfect
competition and scale economies (as in the earlier trade creation and diversion
literature), we take into account three types of allocation effect, one of which was
identied in the last ten years.
The rst of these perfect-competition effects stems from trade volume changes:
when a goods domestic price exceeds its border price (i.e., the price paid to foreign
suppliers), increasing imports lowers the cost of consuming goods and thus raises
national welfare. This is the traditional trade creation effect. Clearly, contracting
imports in such cases produces the opposite result.
The second effect stems from changes in trade prices. When a country is a net
importer of a good, a drop in the border price is benecial (domestic producers lose
less than domestic consumers gain), while the opposite holds when the country is a
net exporter. This corresponds roughly to trade diversion, but it is really a composite of
two effects: supply switching (typically from a supplier outside the preferential trade
area (PTA) to a PTA-based supplier) and the induced changes in the applicable
border prices. For instance, if imports came from the lowest-cost supplier prior to
preferential liberalization, any switching from non-PTA suppliers to PTA suppliers
tends to raise the border price that PTA members pay after the arrangement is
implemented. Deepening a PTA tends to lower welfare for PTA members when
supply switching is accompanied by a rise in applicable border prices.
The novel third effect is interesting, since it shows that trade diversion (at least
the supply-switching part) may actually be welfare improving, although understand-
ing this requires a bit of background. The third effect focuses on trade rents : that is,
the revenue that may arise from selling across the gap between low border prices
and high domestic prices. Textbook import barriers hand the trade rents either to
the domestic government (as in the case of tariffs) or to foreigners (as in the case of
price-xing arrangements or voluntary export restraints). Yet textbook trade barriers
have to a large extent been eliminated in western Europe: about 80% of western
European imports are duty-free and, even including applied dumping duties, the
EUs trade-weighted tariff is only 3%.
European trade is not free, of course, since many frictional barriers drive wedges
between domestic and border prices by raising the real cost of trade (unharmonized
product standards are the prime example). Such barriers create no trade rents, they
just burn up resources. The interesting point is that eliminating frictional barriers 
even on a preferential basis   unambiguously lowers border prices. Thus we may
observe trade diversion (in the sense of supply switching) that raises national welfare
by lowering the cost of imports. Consideration of frictional barriers is central to the
evaluation of eastern EU enlargement, since the Europe Agreements eliminate most
of the textbook import barriers. To put it differently, EU membership will promote
the CEECs from members of a free trade agreement to members of the EUs single
market.
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Since Krugman (1979), trade economists have highlighted the importance of
imperfect competition and scale economies. In the process, three new allocation
effects have been identied: producer prot effects, scale effects and variety effects
(see Francois and Roland-Holst (1996) for details). The rst is easy. In sectors where
the local price exceeds the average cost of production, an expansion of output raises
welfare, since the marginal value of extra output (the price) exceeds the extra cost. A
fall in production yields the opposite result. This effect is sometimes called the pure
prot effect. Scale effects are also quite intuitive. Average cost falls with the scale of
production in most industries, where scale may refer to the size of rms or the size of
sectors. Because lower average costs mean more output with the same inputs,
positive scale effects tend to improve national welfare. Lastly, integration can
increase the range of varieties available to consumers in both regions. More choice
makes consumers happier, and, on the production side, a broader variety of input
choices can boost industrial productivity.
Accumulation effects are quite a different matter. They highlight channels through
which trade arrangements can alter the level of national resources   especially
capital stocks   rather than merely reallocate the existing stock of resources. By their
nature, accumulation effects tend to have a much larger impact on GDP than
allocation effects. Allocation effects involve taking resources out of one activity and
putting them into another. The benet of doing this is limited by the degree to
which resource efciencies initially differ across sectors. In the absence of trade
barriers (or other distortions), market forces even out initial sectoral resource
efciencies. It is not surprising, therefore, to nd that allocation effects typically yield
very small gains in countries that start with well-functioning market economies.
Since accumulation effects change the stock of resources, they can lead to much
larger changes in the amount of goods that can be produced by the same labour
force. (See Baldwin and Francois (1996) and Francois and Reinert (1996) for efforts
to capture such effects empirically.)
3.2. The policy experiments and results: modelling eastern enlargement
Given enough data, one could construct and estimate an econometric model of the
world economy that allowed for all the allocation and accumulation effects
mentioned above. This would clearly be the best approach, were it feasible.
Unfortunately, the current state of data and theory precludes this tack. Instead, we
simulate the economic effects of eastern enlargement by postulating a number of key
relationships.2 As briey summarized in Table 2, the model covers all world trade
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2 Technically, we employ a calibrated general equilibrium model. While the simulation approach has its shortcomings,
it is really the only game in town. This conclusion has also been reached in other elds of applied policy analysis. For
instance, proposed tax changes are routinely evaluated with calibrated simulation models in the empirical public
nance literature.
and production, and it allows for scale economies, imperfect competition and
endogenous capital stocks. Box 1 provides more discussion of the technicalities for
specialists. Interested readers are referred to the 50-page technical appendix to
Francois et al. (1995) for detailed discussion of the theoretical structure of the model.
3.3. Conservative estimates
EU membership for the CEECs will involve a broad gamut of policy changes. The
most obvious involve: (1) elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all
EUCEEC trade, including agriculture trade, and (2) adoption of the EUs
common external tariff (which is generally more liberal than the CEECs current
tariffs against non-western European imports). It will also, however, grant single
market access to the EU15 markets for CEEC rms, and the same access for EU
rms to the CEEC markets. Single market access involves hundreds of very specic
rules (not all of which have even been implemented by the incumbent EU
members), so it is impossible to describe in full here. The idea, however, is that it
establishes the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. The latter two
require open capital markets and unfettered migration. The main elements ensuring
the rst two freedoms are: (1) the mutual recognition of health, safety, industrial and
environmental product standards (after adoption of common minimum standards),
(2) the adoption of a common competition policy and a common state-aids policy,
and (3) removal of frontier controls.
Incorporating the tariff changes in our model is straightforward, with the
exception of agricultural trade. Even though there are no tariffs or quotas on
internal EU farm trade (mad cows excepted), the common agricultural policy
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Table 2. Sectors and regions in the model
Sectors Regions
Agriculture, forestry, sheries CEEC7
Primary mining and fuels EU15
Processed foods EFTA3
*Textiles Former Soviet Union
Apparel North American Free Trade Area
*Non-ferrous metals Asia-Pacic
* Iron and steel North Africa and Middle East
*Chemicals, rubber and plastics Sub-Saharan Africa
*Fabricated metal products Rest of world
*Transport equipment
*Other machinery and equipment
Other manufactures
Services
*Scale economies and imperfect competition.
Note: CEEC7 = Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,
Bulgaria and Romania.
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Box 1. The simulation model: technical presentation
Our model divides the world into nine regions each with thirteen sectors (see Table 2 for
region and sector names). Consumers demands for nal-good sectors are generated from
a representative regional household with CobbDouglas preferences over sectoral
composites. Each sector consists of differentiated products and consumers demand for
these are generated by CES preferences. In seven of the sectors (marked by asterisks in the
table), we allow for scale economies and imperfect competition, along the lines of the
standard DixitStiglitz monopolistic competition model (e.g., xed mark-ups and free
entry). The other sectors are perfect-competition, constant-returns sectors but each
regions output is assumed to be differentiated (Armington assumption).
The central feature of all computable general equilibrium models is the inputoutput
structure that explicitly links industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over
continuously higher stages of intermediate processing, to the nal assembling of goods
and services for consumption. The link between sectors may be direct, like the input of
steel in the production of transport equipment, or indirect, via intermediate use in other
sectors. The model implements this inputoutput structure by assuming that rms use a
mixture of factors (labour and capital) and intermediate inputs. Specically, factors are
combined according to a CES function, while intermediates are used in xed
proportions. This has two signicant ramications: (1) the price of intermediates enters
rms cost functions, so price-raising trade barriers directly affect rms productivity,
and (2) rms demand for each variety of intermediates follow standard CES derived-
demand functions.
With product differentiation in all sectors (differentiation at the rm level in the
increasing-returns sectors and at the regional level in the perfect-competition sectors), the
model supports two-way trade in all traded sectors. The cost of trade (a combination of
trade and transport services) is modelled explicitly. Revenues from non-frictional trade
barriers are returned to the representative consumer in each region.
Regional labour supplies are assumed to be xed, but regional capital stocks are
endogenous. Capital, which includes buildings, is produced according to a xed-
coefcient production function from various intermediate inputs, such as transport
equipment and other machinery. The global steady-state capital stocks is the level which
balances global savings (regional savings rates are xed) with global depreciation.
Regional capital stocks are then determined by a simplied global capital market. That is,
the regional stocks move to maintain the base case relative returns across regions.
The model is calibrated to social accounting data from the last revision (August 1996)
to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 3 dataset. The GTAP dataset
includes information on national and regional inputoutput structure, bilateral trade
ows, nal demand patterns and government intervention, and is benchmarked to 1992.
Protection data are based on World Bank and WTO data on pre- and post-Uruguay
Round protection. We work with the post-Uruguay Round protection data. Formally, this
involves rst modelling the impact of the Uruguay Round. We then work with the
estimated post-Uruguay Round set of social accounting data for the simulation results
presented in this paper.
(CAP) ensures that trade is denitely not free. We capture this by including a very
stylized CAP. Subsidy payments to the EU15 farm sectors are assumed to be
sufcient to maintain output at pre-enlargement levels. A second, very different
difculty arises in trying to model single market access. The complexity of single
market access makes it impossible for us to model it explicitly in a general
equilibrium model. The standard solution to this problem is to model single market
access crudely as a reduction in the real cost of trade. In our simulations, we
quantify this as a 10% reduction in real costs of all CEECEU trade.
Our rst set of results   what we call the conservative scenario  considers only
the allocation and accumulation effects that the above-mentioned policy changes
have on the global economy. These are presented below. Section 3.4 presents a less
conservative set of policy experiments, which allow eastern enlargement   and
implicitly the failure of eastern enlargement   to change the risk premiums on
investment in the CEECs.
Table 3 presents the aggregate real income and trade effects of eastern EU
enlargement for the conservative scenario.3 Three aspects of the results are worth
mentioning. First, all European regions gain from enlargement. This need not have
been the case. For instance, one might have guessed that at least the non-EU
European countries (EFTA3 and ex-USSR) might have been harmed by the
discriminatory aspects of eastern enlargement. Second, while all income effects are
positive, the CEECs gain much more than the EU in relative terms. Specically, the
CEECs 1.5% rise in real income is seven times larger than the EU gain. Most of the
asymmetric gain can be explained by the fact that the CEEC economies were
initially more distorted, so EU enlargement involves a greater degree of own-
liberalization. For instance, the initial CEEC applied tariff rate is twice that of the
EU. Nevertheless, since the EU15 economy is twenty times larger than that of the
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Table 3. Real income effects: conservative case
Real income change Real income change
(1992 ECUbn (% change
change from base case) from base case)
CEEC7 2.5 1.5
EU15 9.8 0.2
EFTA3 0.2 0.1
Ex-USSR 1.1 0.3
Notes:  This is a comparative steady-state exercise, so real income changes
are not equivalent to utility-based welfare changes. Real income is GDP.
EFTA3 is Norway, Iceland and the Swiss-Liechtenstein customs union.
Source:  Authors calculations.
3 The model produces results for all nine regions, but the impact on the non-European regions is vanishingly small.
CEECs, the ECU gain to the EU is almost four times greater than the gain to the
CEECs. The third point concerns the aggregate export effects. Due to the combined
effect of the CEECs own-liberalization, improved access to the EU market, and the
expansion of the CEEC economies due to positive accumulation effects, the CEECs
are projected to increase exports by more than 25%. Since enlargement is only a
mild liberalization for the incumbent EU members, aggregate EU15 exports rise by
only 1.5%.
As far as the impact on the EU is concerned (by far the most sensitive issue, given
EU leaders fears about the economics of enlargement), our results are in line with
Brown et al. (1995). Those authors nd that a free trade area between the Visegrad
countries and the EU would raise EU real income by ECU13.3 billion. Our results
are not exactly comparable to the Brown et al. ndings, however, since those
authors undertake an exercise that differs in two important ways (apart from the
obvious fact that they use a different CGE model that is calibrated to a different data
set). First, they examine the effects of a free trade area, not a customs union.
Consequently, they do not require the CEECs to adopt the EUs common external
tariff. This potentially makes an important difference, since the CEECs have much
higher tariffs on heavy industry and much lower tariffs on food. As a result, our
results incorporate the effects of much more substantial industrial restructuring than
do theirs. Second, they consider only the Visegrad countries rather than the CEEC7
as in our exercise. The economic impact they nd for the Visegrad countries
amounts to about ECU9 billion, which is much larger than our conservative
estimates. As we see below, however, the ECU9 billion of Brown et al. is much
smaller than the number we nd in our less conservative scenario, to which we turn
now.
3.4. Less conservative estimates
3.4.1. The risk premium effect. The conservative scenario discussed above
includes a simple variation on the classical savings mechanism, by which increased
returns to regional capital lead to increased levels of regional investment and hence
to an increased capital stock. We do not believe, however, that this will be the end of
the story. The CEECs are currently a risky place to invest. Fortunes have been made
by those who are lucky (or well connected), but fortunes have been lost. The
uncertainty stems from microeconomic sources and macroeconomic sources. Since
the transitions began, the micro sources have included, inter alia, bank failures,
privatization, bankruptcies, unpredictable changes in subsidy, trade and indirect tax
policies, and sudden changes in the legal system, industrial standards and
regulation, and administrative procedures. In short, these are economies in
transition. At least in those CEECs that seem likely to join the EU soon, the prospect
of EU membership has already greatly reduced the riskiness in one very direct way.
EU membership gives investors some idea of the direction in which transition is
EU ENLARGEMENT 139
heading. Such is not the case for other economies in transition  the examples of
Russia and the Ukraine come to mind  that have virtually no prospect of joining
the EU.
The macro sources of uncertainty include unanticipated changes in ination rates,
interest rates and exchange rates. In many of the CEECs, these macro sources of
instability are linked to the micro sources. One classic link is that attempts to
subsidize sunset industries on a large scale lead to large scal decits that are covered
by printing money. Also, a large measure of the ination in these countries stems
from initial price shocks that occurred when prices were liberalized and currencies
deeply devalued. Finally, given the potential for political instability in Russia and the
lack of security guarantees from, for example, NATO, there remains some small
uncertainty about the territorial integrity of the CEECs, especially prior to EU
membership.
Joining the EU will make the CEECs substantially less risky from the point of
view of domestic and foreign investors. On the micro side, EU membership greatly
constrains arbitrary trade and indirect tax policy changes. It also locks in well-
dened property rights and codies competition policy and state-aids policy. By
securing convertibility, open capital markets and rights of establishment, member-
ship assures investors that they can put in and take out money. Finally, EU
membership guarantees that CEEC-produced products have unparalleled access to
the EU15 markets (which account for almost 30% of world income). On the macro
side, membership puts the CEECs on a path to eventual monetary union and thus
provides a solid hedge against ination spurts. These two aspects of membership are
likely to have a related impact on investor condence and are likely to be mutually
reinforcing.
3.4.2. Guesstimating the impact on the CEEC risk premium. The statement
that EU membership will make the CEECs less risky sites for physical investments
seems uncontroversial to us. The hard and therefore controversial part is to quantify
the impact that enlargement will have on CEEC risk premiums. Rates of return on
capital differ sharply across nations, and these differences are often very persistent.
One common explanation for this is that investors demand a risk premium on funds
invested in nations with economic and/or political environments that are perceived
as unstable.
As Figure 3 shows, country risk does correlate with rates of return. The gure
plots, on the horizontal axis, World Bank estimates of the basis point spread charged
to emerging economies for dollar-denominated xed rate issues in 1994. The
vertical axis plots country risk indexes for 1995. (A similar pattern, not shown, holds
for the spread on the effective dollar yield of domestic debt issues calculated from
IMF International Financial Statistics data for medium-term domestic debt issues
adjusted for currency movements.) The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are
arrayed along the middle of the spectrum, with the Czech Republic ranked as the
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best risk and Hungary as the worst. Poland is ranked as a risk comparable to Greece.
Russia is off the charts on both axes, and data for Bulgaria and Romania are
unavailable (not a good omen). The unweighted CEEC average for those in the
sample (not shown) is located quite close to Poland.
This pattern suggests a simple, albeit rudimentary, way of quantifying the impact
of risk on national capital markets. We make the somewhat ad hoc assumption that
the CEEC average country risk index moves down to the range of Portugal after EU
accession. This implies that the relative return demanded by savers for investment in
the region should drop by roughly 15%, which translates to about 45 basis points.
Finally, we retain the same trade barrier changes as in the conservative scenario and
we assume that the relative regional rates of return are the same for all regions
except the CEECs (which are lowered by 45 basis points). Of course, the CEEC
capital stock must rise substantially to bring CEEC capitals actual rate of return
down to the new assumed steady-state level.
This approach is plainly quite ad hoc, but we feel that it captures an element in the
EU membership that is essential for the CEECs. Moreover, there is some historical
evidence suggesting a correlation between investment and membership, at least in
poor entrants. First, we note that a range of case studies for the Iberian countries
also support our basic contention that EU membership can be good for investment
in poor entrants. For Spain, the boost to investment from accession and the effect on
the current account are documented by ViÓnals et al. (1990) and by Ortega et al.
(1990). The stimulus to foreign investment is analysed by Bajo and Sosvilla (1990).
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Figure 3. Risk and return in emerging markets
Sources:  Horizontal axis risk premium: World Bank estimates from 1996 World Debt Tables, Extracts.
Vertical axis country risk index: Economist Intelligence Unit, various issues.
For both Portugal and Spain, Braga de Macedo and Torres (1990) specically
demonstrate the decline in country risk premium following accession.
3.4.3. Prima facie historical case. In addition to the detailed case studies listed
above, we can make a prima facie case by eyeballing historical data for the six
countries that joined the EU during the 1973, 1981 and 1986 enlargements (the
1995 enlargement is too recent to permit study). However, to interpret the historical
evidence correctly requires a little theory. A countrys capital stock is xed by the
equality of the demand for capital and the supply of capital. Anything that shifts
either schedule will change the equilibrium (i.e., steady-state) capital stock. If the
change requires the nations capital stock to rise, above-normal investment will
result. The opposite is predicted for changes that require the nations capital stock to
drop.
The theoretical situation is shown in Figure 4, where the solid lines indicate the
initial situation. The demand curve shows that the marginal product of capital
declines when the capital stock rises, due to economy-wide diminishing returns. The
capital supply curve shows that savers will demand higher rates of return to invest
more in the particular country, reecting both the willingness of consumers to
postpone consumption by investing today and a portfolio analysis for savers. The
initial equilibrium capital stock, shown as K0, is not at the intersection of the supply
and demand curves for capital, since we assume that the country faces a risk
premium. On average, investors earn r0  on their investments, but due to the
uncertainty involved, they act as if earning an expected return of r0  with uncertainty
were equivalent to earning r0  d0  with certainty (here d0  is the countrys risk
premium).
Joining the European Union can affect the position of the demand curve and it
can affect the size of the risk premium. The demand shift can come from many
mechanisms. For instance, membership improves the countrys market access to
Europes largest markets. If the country exports goods (e.g., manufactured goods)
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Figure 4.
that are capital intensive relative to its non-traded goods (e.g., government services)
then extra market access shifts up the nations capital demand curve. This shift is
illustrated in the diagram by a dashed line. (See Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) for a
formal illustration of this trade-and-growth link and for many others.) The reduction
in the risk premium can come from many sources, including a change in the
underlying uncertainty (i.e., a bona de stability of the economy) and an enhanced
ability of investors to diversify risk (i.e., when domestic residents get improved access
to wider capital markets). The post-enlargement risk premium, shown as d,  in the
gure, is less than the pre-enlargement premium of d0.
These two changes   a drop in the risk premium and an upward shift in the
capital demand curve  result in an unambiguous increase in the capital stock (from
K0  to K, ), but an ambiguous effect on the real rate of return. To see this, note that
as we have drawn it, the real return rises from r0  to r, , but if we had eliminated the
risk premium altogether, we would have predicted a drop from r0  to the point
where the new demand and old supply curves intersect.
There are a few other things to note. First, the upward demand shift will normally
be associated with an increase in the protability of existing capital. This should
show up in the average behaviour of the stock market, as long as the stock market
reects a broad sample of rms. The caveat comes from the fact that liberalization
almost always harms some rms and sectors, even when it is benecial to the nation
as a whole. If the stock market is dominated by, say, state-controlled white elephants
that will face increased pressure in a more liberal economy, then enlargement may
be accompanied by a drop in the stock market index. Second, the diagram does not
distinguish between domestic and foreign investors. An improvement in the national
investment climate should attract more investment from both sources. This is likely
to leave three kinds of footprint in the data. The investment-to-GDP ratio should
rise, the current account should deteriorate as more foreign funds come in, and the
net direct investment gures should improve. Finally, note that all of these initial
effects eventually wear off as the capital stock adjusts to its new level.
3.4.4. Historical data. We turn now to the evidence for the six countries that joined
the EU during the 1973, 1981 and 1986 enlargements. Figure 5 shows the current
account decits for the 1973 entrants (Denmark, Ireland and the UK), the 1981
entrant (Greece) and the 1986 entrants (Portugal and Spain). For the six, entry was
generally accompanied by an increase in capital inows, although the pattern is
certainly not stark. For instance, when we calculate the mean current account decit
for each entrant during the ve years preceding accession, and the mean for the year
of accession plus ve years, we see that in all cases except Portugal the post-accession
capital inow is larger.
Figure 6 shows the change in stock market indices for the six entrants. The
Iberian enlargement was clearly accompanied by a stock market boom, while the
Greek accession did not produce such a result. The evidence for the 1973
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Figure 5. Current accounts for 1973, 1981 and 1986 entrants (8 years pre- and 9 years
post-accession where data permit)
Source:  IMF IFS databank.
Zero is year of accession
Zero is year of accession
enlargement is much more confused  at least in part due to the unsettled
macroeconomic environment of the early 1970s (the rst oil price shock and rising
ination). To provide a benchmark, we also plot the GDP-weighted average
movement of the EC5 stock markets (the EC6 less Luxembourg, for which data are
available only from 1970). We see that the three entrants (Denmark, Ireland and the
UK) did no better than average for the rst few years. Further out, however, say
nine years after membership, Ireland is doing much better than the average of
incumbents. This ts in with our general idea that enlargement is likely to have the
greatest impact on the countries that are economically the furthest behind the EU
incumbents: namely, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. When it comes to stock
market data, Greece is the exception among the poor entrants. As we shall see, the
poor performance of Greece is echoed in several other indicators. To us this
indicates that EU membership provides an opportunity for poor countries to catch
up. There is, however, nothing automatic about the benets.
The real interest data are much harder to interpret. As our theoretical discussion
indicated, the combination of increased demand and reduced risk premium can
result in either an increase or a decrease in real rates. Moreover, inspection of the
data shows examples of both, so we do not provide a plot of the data. In brief, we
nd that the Iberians seem to have experienced a rise in real rates, but the pattern is
much less clear for the other four nations.
Finally, Figure 7 shows the investment-to-GDP ratios (gross xed business
investment as a share of GDP) for all six entrants. Until the mid-1970s, Portugal and
Spain were under dictatorships that typically ruled the economies with a heavy and
sometimes arbitrary hand. Investment in these countries was consequently a risky
business for those without close connections to the dictators. The end of the Iberian
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Figure 6. Stock market indices (accession year = 100)
dictatorships and their EU membership bids transformed the investment climate on
the Iberian peninsula. As the gure shows, the change in the Portuguese investment
rate is especially marked around the beginning of accession talks in 1978. The talks
dragged on, however, proving much more difcult than foreseen. The nal outcome
was not clear (at least for Spain) until 19845. The accession treaties were nally
signed in 1985, with entry occurring in 1986. It is interesting to note that the
investment rates in Portugal move in tandem with progress in the membership talks.
Spains investment rate did not pick up until membership was virtually assured.
Recent years have seen the Iberian investment rates converging towards the EU
averages. It seems, therefore, that the investment boost was transitional. The gure
shows that Ireland experienced a similar investment boom during the decade
following its accession. For Greece, however, accession had little impact on
investment.
Clearly this evidence does not prove that EU membership is good for investment.
Nor does it justify our specic quantitative assumption for the effect of accession on
country risk. It does, however, provide a prima facie case that EU accession can be
helpful in encouraging investment in poor entrants (namely Spain, Portugal and
Ireland) and support for the assertion that the Iberian investment-led growth in the
1980s was greatly boosted by the prospect of EU membership. An important caveat
is that EU membership in the mid-1980s involved far fewer constraints on domestic
policy than it does now. Neither the single market programme nor monetary union
were faits accomplis at that point.
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3.4.5. Simulation results. Table 4 presents the aggregate impact of enlargement
under the less conservative scenario. Note rst that the impact on the EU15 is
almost unchanged from the conservative case   under both scenarios, the EU15
gain about ECU10 billion. The same holds true for the EFTA3 and the ex-USSR.
The big change is the gain for the CEECs themselves. This should not be a
surprising result, since the assumed risk premium reduction impacts primarily on the
CEECs capital stock. The projected gain  about ECU30 billion  is enormous by
the standards of similar simulation models. Most of the extra real income gain comes
from the estimated 68% rise in the CEEC capital stock (the CEEC capital stock
rises by only 1.2% in the conservative scenario).
Sensitivity analyses of the less conservative scenario are shown in Table 5. The
two most arbitrary assumptions in the less conservative scenario are the trade cost
reduction and the size of the risk premium reduction. First, still assuming that
membership lowers eastwest trading cost by 10%, we consider different shocks to
the risk premium on central European investment ranging from 0% (this is
equivalent to the conservative scenario) to 15% (the less conservative scenario). The
rst column in Table 5 (top panel) shows that the real income gain of the CEECs
falls from ECU30.1 billion to 6.2 billion as the risk premium reduction goes from
15% to 5%. The second column of the top panel shows that the consequences for
the EU15 are much less. Second, we hold the risk premium shock at the less
conservative scenario assumption of 15% and vary the trade cost reduction
assumption. The results for both the EU15 and the CEEC7 (shown in the bottom
panel of the table) are little affected by these changes.
That the effects on the CEECs remain large under different scenarios is
important. The CEECs are already keen on joining the European Union for
geopolitical reasons, so even the nding of a signicant negative economic impact
would be unlikely to affect their ardour for rapid membership. The same cannot be
said for the EU15 and it is the EU15 who will decide the timing of enlargement.
True, the EU15 are all committed to admitting the CEECs eventually, but their
perception of the large economic costs of eastern enlargement seems to have made
them reluctant to hasten the enlargement process.
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Table 4. Real income effects: less conservative case
Real income change Real income change
(1992 ECUbn, (% change
change from base case) from base case)
CEEC7 30.1 18.8
EU15 11.2 0.2
EFTA3 0.1 0.1
Ex-USSR 2.1 0.6
Notes: This is a comparative steady-state exercise, so real income
changes are not equivalent to utility-based welfare changes. EFTA3
is Norway, Iceland and the Swiss-Liechtenstein customs union.
Source:  Authors calculations.
3.5. Sharing out the economic benets
Our simulation model does not contain individual member states, so we cannot
determine how the aggregate gain is distributed among the various EU15 nations.
This is, nonetheless, an important political issue, so we present some back-of-
the›envelope calculations. Under both scenarios, the simulation breaks down
changes in the EU15s GDP by sector. As a rst step, we distribute these sectoral
changes to member states using the importance of each member states sector (as
measured by value added) in the EU15 sector totals. These changes do not add up
to the EU15s aggregate real income gain, since consumers also gain from price
changes. The difference  which is due to projected price changes in the enlarged
EU  is allocated among incumbent member states according to their share of
EU15 income. The results of this admittedly rudimentary procedure are listed in
Table 6.4 (The shares are very similar under the two scenarios, so we report only
the  estimated distribution for our preferred scenario  the less conservative
estimates.)
The gains are distributed in a very uneven fashion. The shares of Germany,
France and the UK sum to more than two-thirds of the whole ECU11.2 billion that
the EU15 are projected to gain. Given Germanys overall size and dominance of the
EU sectors that are projected to expand the most (transport equipment and capital
goods), it is not surprising that Germany gets a third of the total. Both France and
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4 An alternative set of calculations, based on the approximation of member state welfare effects through simple partial
equilibrium estimates based on member country trade effects, leads to the same qualitative pattern of results.
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: real income effects
(1992 ECUbn change from base case)
CEEC7 EU15
Different risk premium shocks
0% reduction 2.5 9.8
5% reduction 6.2 10.0
10% reduction 14.5 10.3
15% reduction 30.1 11.2
Trade cost reductions (with 15% risk premium reduction)
5% reduction 29.5 10.2
10% reduction 30.1 11.2
15% reduction 30.4 11.8
Notes:  These are a comparative steady-state exercise, so real income
changes are not equivalent to utility-based welfare changes. EFTA3 is
Norway, Iceland and the Swiss-Liechtenstein customs union.
Source:  Authors calculations.
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Table 6. Distribution of gains among EU incumbents
(change from base case, less conservative scenario)
1992 ECUbn % of EU15 total
Germany 3.8 33.8
France 2.2 19.3
UK 1.6 14.1
Italy 1.0 8.5
Spain 0.8 7.0
Netherlands 0.5 4.6
Sweden 0.4 3.9
BelgiumLuxembourg 0.3 2.6
Austria 0.3 2.6
Denmark 0.2 1.9
Finland 0.2 1.4
Ireland 0.0 0.3
Greece 0.0 0.3
Portugal 0.0 0.4
EU15 11.2 100.0
Note:  See text for methodology.
Source:  Authors calculations.
the UK get double-digit shares (19% and 14% respectively)   again not surprising,
given the size and sectoral composition of the French and UK economies. The
Netherlands and Spain each take between about 5% and 10% of the total gain. The
Dutch gure comes largely from the fact that this economy focuses on sectors whose
GDPs rise with enlargement. The high Spanish gure stems partly from the sharing
out of the sectoral GDP gains (the Spanish economy is quite diversied) and partly
from the fact that the fairly large size of the Spanish economy ensures that Spain
takes a healthy slice of the consumer gains stemming from lower prices. Each of the
other incumbents gets less than 5% of the total gain. Portugal is the only incumbent
that is estimated to lose on these narrow economic grounds. This loss reects
Portugals heavy reliance on textiles (this is the EU sector that takes the biggest hit
from enlargement according to our projections). Portugals loss, however, is
vanishingly small and, given the inherent imprecision of CGE models, it is best to
think of this gure as zero.
4. THE BUDGET COST OF A VISEGRAD ENLARGEMENT IN 2000
Since Baldwin et al. (1992) and Baldwin (1994), the costs to the EU budget have
acquired a disproportionate prominence in the public debate on eastern enlarge-
ment. Yet they are important politically, and some extreme estimates have aroused
political reaction. This section quanties the budget burden by reviewing and
evaluating an extensive literature on this issue. It also makes a novel contribution by
using a power politics approach to estimating the budget impact. Before turning to
the estimates, we present the essentials of the EUs budget.5
4.1. The EU budget: a primer
Table 7 shows that two items dominate the spending side of the EU budget, the
common agricultural policy (CAP) and structural spending (the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund). Together these account for over 80% of all EU spending.
The importance of structural and agriculture spending accurately reects their
importance in the Union. Dr Pangloss would say this spending helps various regions
and groups adjust to the pressures of European economic integration. Machiavelli
would say these funds are payoffs to politically powerful special interest groups that
might otherwise oppose European integration. Both would agree that these
programmes are a key ingredient in the political cement that binds member states
into a union and allows the EU to be much more than a free trade area. Eastern
enlargement will greatly increase the EUs economic diversity and thereby multiply
the centrifugal forces. Structural and farm spending will continue to be needed to
contain them.
Revenue is generated from four main sources. The most important is VAT
receipts. According to agreed rules, the Union gets a slice of each members national
VAT revenue. (The precise rules are very complex; see Strasser (1992) for details.)
The second and third sources, namely tariff revenue and agricultural levies (variable
tariffs until recently), are quite straightforward: all tariff revenue accrues directly to
the EU. The fourth major income source is based on members GNPs and is used to
top up revenue to balance accounts (the budget must be balanced each year). The
net effect of these four sources is a modestly progressive tax rate.
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Table 7. EU budget, 1994
Revenue Spending
VAT 48.4% CAP 49.4%
Tariffs 18.4% Structural Funds 31.9%
Agricultural levies 3.3% R & D 4.4%
GNP based 27.4% Administration 5.3%
Other 2.1% Foreign aid 6.7%
Other 2.3%
Total (ECUbn) 68.6 Total (ECUbn) 67.6
Source:  EU Court of Auditors (1995).
5 See El-Agraa (1994) and EU Court of Auditors (1995) for more details. See Laffan and Shackleton (1996) for an
excellent general discussion of the budget, budget politics and a history of the EU budget conicts that followed
previous enlargements.
4.1.1. Structural Funds. The Structural Funds are large transfers to the disadvan-
taged member states and regions. The funds are explicitly aimed at encouraging
convergence of per capita income levels. Spending is classied by the nature of the
problem it is aimed at. The regions or groups that are the focus of these aims are
called Objectives 16. The most important of these   Objective 1  accounts for
two-thirds of all structural spending.6 Also important is the Cohesion Fund for
countries with national income per capita less than 90% of the EU average; in
practice this rule was set to ensure that only the poor-4 (Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain) qualied. Structural Funds spending is by far the most rapidly growing
budget item since 1988. When the current budget plan ends in 1999, this spending
should amount to ECU33 billion  a fourfold increase from 1988. Given that
CEEC per capita incomes are all below that of the poorest of the EU15 (Greece),
the most relevant aspect of this expenditure is its close link with per capita incomes.
4.1.2. Common agricultural policy. The CAP is a very complicated, expensive
set of policies aimed at raising income and output of the EU farm sector. This
support takes two main forms: (1) price oors (every six months agriculture ministers
gather to set the correct prices for farm products) and (2) direct payments
(compensation) to farmers. The direct payments are linked to the price oors, in
the sense that they were intended to buy off opposition to the 1992 MacSharry
reforms that brought the price oors down towards market-clearing levels.
Compensation payments are linked to historical production on land that is taken out
of production.
The price oors are maintained with two types of policy: protection and market
intervention. Protection is insufcient, since the EU price oors are above the zero-
import level. Consequently, the EU must buy up the food shunned by EU
consumers at these above-market-clearing prices. This excess food is disposed of in
one of three ways. It is stored until it rots; it is dumped on the EU market (e.g., the
EU subsidizes wheat purchases by EU bakeries); or it is dumped (i.e., sold below
cost) on world markets. The rising costs of this intervention led to the introduction
of production quotas in some products. Since 1984 the food surplus is restricted by
quotas per farm (e.g., for milk), and by requiring farmers not to grow food on part
of their land. More than half the cost of this support is paid for directly by
consumers via the hidden tax of protectionism, according to OECD (1992). The
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6 Objective 1 regions are dened as regions with per capita incomes that are less than 75% of the EU average, and
over 20% of the current EU population is eligible under this objective. This spending is aimed at improving
infrastructure and local training. Objective 2 regions are those that suffer from a decline of traditional industries such
as coal and steel. Over 45 million of the EUs 340 million citizens live in these regions. The spending under this
objective is aimed at creating jobs, improving the environment, developing R & D and renovating land and buildings.
Objective 5b regions are rural areas, like the Highlands of Scotland, that are too rich for Objective 1 but still face
development difculties. The other objectives are aimed at the long-term unemployed (Objective 3), unemployed
youth (Objective 4); backward farms (Objective 5a), the eastern states of Germany (Regulation No. 3575/90) and
Arctic regions (Objective 6).
rest is paid for out of the EU budget   more precisely, from the European
Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).
The budget costs are mostly linked to food surpluses (output less consumption).
The consumption side is straightforward, since food demand varies with income and
prices in a predictable manner. The output side is essentially intractable: the hard
part is to guess how much CEEC farm yields would rise under the CAP, which
depends on the extent to which guaranteed prices and sales would stimulate
technology transfers and foreign direct investment by western agro-corporations.
4.2. A survey of existing estimates
There is an extensive literature on the cost of eastern enlargement. Three Cs 
CAP, cohesion and contributions   dominate the calculations. Of the three, the
level of the CEECs national contributions as members is least controversial. All
member states put in about 1% of GDP. The big debates are over CAP and
cohesion spending. We turn rst to the studies on cohesion spending.
4.2.1. Cohesion cash. The best-known early estimation (Courchene et al., 1993) was
based on a simple extrapolation of the current level of per capita Structural Funds
(SF) receipts in the two poorest incumbents. While per capita SF receipts vary
widely among member states (see Table 8), Courchene et al. (1993) settled on a
rounded-off average of Greek and Portuguese receipts: namely, ECU200 per person.
The Edinburgh summit promised to double this by 1999, so the gure of ECU400
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Table 8. Structural Funds allocation, 1993
Total SF Per capita SF SF as % of
(ECUbn) (ECU) GNP
Ireland 1088 311 2.8
Portugal 2327 233 2.6
Greece 1897 184 2.5
Spain 2971 76 0.7
Italy 3398 59 0.4
France 1682 30 0.2
UK 1213 21 0.1
Luxembourg 14 43 0.1
Denmark 107 21 0.1
Belgium 187 19 0.1
Netherlands 206 14 0.1
Germany 870 11 0.1
EU12 15962 47
Portugal and
Greece average 208
Poor-4 average 7788 132
Note:  Structural Funds (SF) include EAGGF, Regional and Social Funds.
Source:  Court of Auditors, Report on 1993. GNP/pop. from World Bank.
per person was used to project enlargement costs. Just for the 64 million people in
the Visegrad-4 countries, this amounts to ECU26 billion.
This widely inuential estimate has been questioned by the European Commis-
sion in its Interim Report on eastern enlargement (1995a), and by independent
analysts (e.g., Grabbe and Hughes, 1996). The primary criticism points out that
ECU400 per capita implies unrealistically high levels of aid absorption for the
CEECs. Moreover, CEEC governments under severe scal pressure would be
unable to provide matching funds on anything like the scale that current
regulations would require. As Table 9 shows, even with their current low income
levels boosted by sustained 5% growth, ECU400 per person would amount to
1015% of these countries GNPs in 2000. Suppose we take 5% of GNP as a more
realistic upper bound. The projected Visegrad SF spending under this rule amounts
to ECU12.8 billion.
4.2.2. How to spend the money. Current incumbents are having trouble spending
all the SF allocated to them: in 1994 actual expenditures were only 70% of the
planned expenditures, partly because of the matching funds constraint. Yet the
structural problems facing the transition economies dwarf those of Greece and
Portugal. One can easily think of ways of spending cash productively on the CEECs.
For example, the human capital infrastructure needs updating. Expensive training
courses in western Europe and consultancy fees for western experts could rapidly
soak up ECU400 per person per year. The environmental infrastructure could also
devour large amounts. Lastly, one might argue that the CEECs should be exempted
from making national contributions. To put numbers to this, say Poland managed to
spend as much as Ireland on traditional Objective 1 projects (2.8% of GNP) and was
exempted from national contributions (1% of GNP). Per Pole, this would account for
ECU74 in Objective 1 aid and ECU27 in exempted contributions. Next suppose
Poland sent 0.5% of its population on training courses in western Europe and paid
western consultancies to train another 0.5% of its population in-country. Taking the
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Table 9. Projected Structural Funds spending
Projection assuming Implied aid Projection assuming
ECU400 per capita absorption 5% of GDP
(ECUbn) (%) in 2000
(ECUbn)
Czech Republic 4.1 9.3 2.2
Slovak Republic 2.1 13.3 0.8
Hungary 4.1 7.8 2.7
Poland 15.4 12.4 6.2
Slovenia 0.8 4.2 0.9
Visegrad total 26.6 12.8
Note:  See text for methodology.
EUs HCM grants in the early 1990s as a landmark (i.e., ECU40 000 per year per
participant) for this training, we get to an average of ECU400 per Pole for training.
All this is without considering spending on environmental clean-up. Moreover, as
section 4.3 shows, the EU has been willing to change spending rules for new entrants.
Adding in new poor countries will lower the EU average income. Recalling that
Objective 1 status (this status qualies the region for big transfers) requires a region
to be below 75% of the EU average, we see that enlargement will necessarily lift
some currently eligible regions over the 75% line! While politics makes this unlikely,
the possibility does suggest a source of savings on SF spending. Begg (1996)
calculates that an aggregate population of 45 million would lose their Objective 1
standing if the ten CEECs were admitted. Spain would also lose its Cohesion Fund
status. We do not attempt to calculate these savings because we believe that the rules
will probably be changed to maintain the incumbent regions Objective 1 status. All
in all, therefore, it seems that a 5% of GNP limit is the most reasonable estimate.
Ireland, Greece and Portugal have very different per capita income levels, yet each
of them receives approximately 2.5% of its GNP in SF. Doubling that rate, we take
the implied ECU13 billion for the Visegrad-4 as the consensus estimate.
4.2.3. CAP cash. The debate on the cost of extending the CAP to the Visegrad-4 is
far more complex, due to the complexity of the CAP itself, the lack of accurate data
on CEEC farms, and the rapidly evolving nature of eastern agriculture. The range
of estimates is correspondingly wide. Table 10 shows estimates for the CAP cost of a
Visegrad enlargement that range from ECU4 billion (Brenton and Gros, 1993) to
ECU37 billion (Anderson and Tyers, 1993). The more recent estimates, however,
have converged signicantly. There are two main reasons for this. First, much better
data became available with Jackson and Swinnen (1994). Second, the impact of the
MacSharry reforms was much clearer after a few years of implementation. For these
reasons, all 1995 and 1996 estimates put the cost at ECU515 billion with
ECU10 billion being a fairly representative estimate.7
Tangermann (1996) points out that two key elements lead to the wide range of
estimates. First is the assumption concerning eastern farm productivity. The CEEC
farm sectors, like every other sector, experienced a sharp decline in output during
the early transition years (however, industrial output fell even more quickly than
farm output). The reasons were abnormal climatic conditions in 1992 and 1993, a
sharp drop in real output prices accompanied by a sharp rise in input prices, and
disruption of marketing infrastructure (see EC, 1995b). The low-end estimates
essentially assume that this drop is permanent and would not be reversed by the
4050% price rises that would come with the CAP. The high-end estimates assume
154 RICHARD E. BALDWIN ET AL.
7 Despite the wide range of numerical estimates, virtually all independent authors agree on a key qualitative
conclusion: the CAP must be reformed before the eastern enlargement.
that massive technological transfers and/or direct investment by western agro-
industry would raise eastern yields to western levels. The second factor is assump-
tions about CAP reform. The earliest estimates ignored the MacSharry reforms,
especially supply controls, set-asides and compensation payments.
CAP costs face two external limitations, neither completely immutable, but both
politically difcult to alter. The rst is the EUs own cap on CAP spending increases.
An EU rule   in effect since 1988  limits CAP spending to rise not faster than 74%
of the Unions GDP growth. If this rule, which was respected during the last
enlargement, were applied to a Visegrad enlargement in 2000, CAP spending could
rise by no more than about ECU0.9 billion.8 Plainly this rule will be binding. The
second involves the GATT commitments undertaken by the CEECs during the
Uruguay Round. Most CEECs bound their protection rates and subsidized export
levels far more stringently than did the EU. Thus, according to Tangermann
(1996), even the conservative estimates suggest that the Visegrad-4 would violate
their GATT cereals export commitments by 400500% under the CAP. Of course,
Article 24 of GATT would in principle allow the CEECs to break these commit-
ments when they join the EUs customs union, but non-European farm exporters
will demand compensation. For instance, the EU awarded compensation to the US
farm interests following the 1986 and 1995 enlargements.
4.2.4. How reasonable are the estimates? There is a simple test of the
reasonableness of the CAP estimates. Table 11 shows the CAP cash per farmer and
per hectare in the EU12 in 1994. Countries are ranked in descending order of
average receipts per farmer, from Belgiums spectacular 12 300 to Portugals modest
EU ENLARGEMENT 155
Table 10. Estimated CAP cost of eastern enlargement (ECUbn)
Study Visegrad-4 CEEC10
Anderson and Tyers (1995) 37
Tyers (1994) 34
Brenton and Gros (1993) 431 3255
MahÑe (1995) 616
Tangermann and Josling (1994) 914
EC (1995c) 12
Slater and Atkinson (1995) 515 923
Tangermann (1996) 1315
Note:  Slovenia joined the Visegrad-4 after the studies were completed.
Sources:  See References.
8 Using the Commissions Interim Report statistics on Visegrad and EU15 GDPs, and assuming 5% and 2% growth
for the Visegrad-4 and EU15 respectively, the Visegrad enlargement would increase EU GDP by only 3%, so CAP
spending can rise by only 2.22%. The current Financial Perspective foresees CAP expenditures of ECU38.4 billion.
1500.9 The bottom of the ECU515 billion estimated cost range assumes that
CEEC farmers will get less than 20% of the EU12 average, and the top assumes
they will get about 60% of the EU12 average. Yet Visegrad-4 climatic conditions
and geography suggest that their farm output should resemble that of a northern EU
incumbent, like Germany or Denmark. This is important, since the CAP is heavily
biased towards northern European farm products (notice the correlation between
latitude and ECU per farmer). In other words, one might be tempted to compare
Polish farmers with German farmers. Such a temptation should be resisted,
however, since most CAP payments are linked to output. The low productivity of
Visegrad-4 farmers therefore suggests low CAP receipts. Moreover, the low
productivity of Visegrad-4 farmers is quite in line with the low productivity of their
workers in other sectors (by denition, the low GDP per capita tells us that they
have low labour productivity).
The ECU per hectare gures in the nal column of Table 11 may prove a more
reliable guide to gauging reasonableness. One can argue that capital and technology
are more mobile than workers (farmers in this case), so eastwest land productivity
differentials should equalize faster than eastwest labour productivities. The ECU
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Table 11. Cost estimates in perspective, 1994 data
CAP cash Farmers ECU per Farm land ECU per
(ECUm) (m) farmer (m hectares) hectare
B 1229 0.1 12 290 1.3 914
IRL 1658 0.1 11 845 4.3 388
DK 1321 0.2 8806 2.7 482
F 8621 1.0 8226 27.0 319
NL 1948 0.3 7379 2.0 967
D 6159 1.0 5951 17.0 362
EU12 39 909 7.1 5621 117.9 339
UK 3070 0.6 5433 16.4 187
E 4953 1.2 4303 24.7 200
I 6724 1.6 4277 14.7 456
GR 2985 0.8 3779 3.5 844
L 22 0.0 3650 0.1 172
P 1219 0.8 1514 4.0 309
High-, medium- and low-cost estimates for Visegrad enlargement
Visegrad-4 high 15 000 4.50 3332 31.4 478
Visegrad-4 medium 10 000 4.50 2221 31.4 318
Visegrad-4 low 5000 4.50 1111 31.4 159
Notes:  For B, DK, L and P, number of farmers for 1990. Slovenia joined the Visegrad-4
after the studies were completed.
Sources:  EC (1995a, c).
9 Since most CAP cash is linked to output, the distribution of receipts is heavily skewed towards large industrial
farmers. The average therefore combines a few very rich farmers with many modest-income farmers. EC (1994b), for
instance, estimated that 80% of the cash goes to 20% of the farmers.
per hectare measure makes the estimated cost range look eminently reasonable. It
brackets, for instance, the gures for the UK and Denmark. Of course, the land-
based gure has its own faults: a great deal of CAP money goes to non-land-
intensive products such as milk and butter.
4.2.5. Consensus estimates? In summary, the range of estimates is now
remarkably narrow. The estimates from a Visegrad-4 enlargement of ECU10 billion
for CAP spending and ECU13 billion for cohesion spending seem the most sensible.
Assuming these countries grow at 6% per annum on average from 1994 to 2000,
their combined GDP should be about ECU440 billion, so accession in the year 2000
would imply contributions of about ECU4 billion. The net cost should be about
ECU19 billion, 19% of what the 1999 budget would be without enlargement.
4.3. Machiavellis rebuttal: the EU budget and power politics
All the budget estimates cited above assume that the status quo EU spending rules
will continue after the eastern enlargement. While it is easy to see why authors
adopted such an assumption, it is quite wrong. This section presents some theory,
four examples from historical enlargements, and a bit of econometrics to make a
point that may seem obvious to practising policy-makers: power politics dictate the
EUs budget. If one accepts this point of view, and one is willing to assume that the
rules governing the allocation of voting rights to EU members will remain
unchanged, then we have an alternative approach to projecting budget costs. It is
important to keep in mind that this alternative approach assumes that the ongoing
Inter-Governmental Conference will not signicantly alter voting rules.
4.3.1. A little theory: the political economy approach. The dismal science
supposes that people work, save and consume in order to maximize their own well-
being. When the dismal science is applied to the arena of policy, it is called political
economy theory, or political equilibrium analysis. In this arena, policy-makers
choose policies to maximize their own well-being, which consists of staying in ofce.
While this approach is a gross oversimplication, it provides powerful insights into
the impact that eastern enlargement will have on the EU budget.
The EU budget is decided by a complex process, but we focus on the Council of
Ministers. The Council has two main decision rules. On very important issues, such
as the adoption of the EU fundamental law (e.g., the Maastricht Treaty and the
Single European Act), enlargement or scal questions, decisions must be unani-
mous. Because the winning coalition must include everyone, each potential
opponent must be bought off. Many other issues, however, are decided on the basis
of a qualied majority: each country is assigned a certain number of votes, and a
winning coalition need only have 71% of these votes. Of course, the Council decides
many issues each year, so the possibility of horse trading and back scratching is
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great. Countries tend to trade their votes on issues that they view as minor, in
exchange for support on an issue that they view as major, even if the two issues are
totally unrelated.
These rules suggest two very precise denitions of power. The rst   the so-called
ShapleyShubik index (SSI)   denes power as the ability of a country to turn a
losing coalition into a winning coalition. This constitutes power, since a country that
nds itself in such a pivotal situation can ask for something in return, such as extra
budget spending for its citizens, or a rule change that favours its national rms.
Formally, the SSI is the percentage of times that the countrys votes would be
pivotal. While a countrys SSI index is roughly related to the countrys share of votes,
it is also inuenced by the correlation of its voting behaviour with that of other
countries and by the distribution of votes among other countries (see Kirman and
WidgrÑen, 1995). The second measure is simply the countrys number of votes. It is
less elegant, but much easier to construct and understand. As we shall see for the
EU12, the SSI performs slightly better than the vote-based measures.
4.3.2. Power politics, historical enlargements and budget priorities: four
examples. Turning from theory to practice, we shall argue that the political
economy approach is useful in organizing our thinking about the budget impact of
historical enlargements. In particular, we focus on four examples in which new
entrants used their political power to alter EU spending rules in their favour.
UK accession. The EUs current budget system was created by budget treaties of 1970
and 1975. In particular, the 1970 agreement created the own resources system of
national contributions (described above). By making contributions more or less
automatic, this prevented annual haggling over payments. According to Laffan and
Shackleton (1996), the 1970 budget deal was designed to x the rules before the UK,
structurally disadvantaged by the agreement, became a member. (The disadvantage,
which stemmed from the small UK farming sector, meant the UK was a major net
contributor, despite its below-average per capita income level). While this may
overstate the case, we do know that the UK Labour government renegotiated the
terms of accession in 1975. The solution adopted for the UKs large net contribution
 the so-called Financial Mechanism  failed to work, however, and the issue caused
problems until Margaret Thatcher won her famous rebate in 1984.
The lesson should be clear. In a democratic body like the EU, new entrants will
use their newly granted political power to undo any accession terms that they feel
are unjust. Moreover, the strategies used to alter the terms may be detrimental to
the functioning of the organization. The UKs perception of injustice in the terms of
accession led to almost a decade of political difculties. Laffan and Shackleton (1996)
write: Between 1979 and 1984 the member states and the EC institutions were
locked in a protracted dispute about EC revenues and expenditure which
contributed in no small way to the malaise and stagnation of the early 1980s.
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The EFTA enlargement. During the recent enlargement negotiations with Austria,
Finland and Sweden, Structural Funds spending rules were changed. A new
spending criterion, Objective 6, was created to channel funds to remote regions in
Finland and Sweden. Although the amounts are small, the principle is important.
Under pre-1995 rules, Finland and Sweden would have received little from the
Structural Funds or the CAP, and thus would have been signicant net contribu-
tors to the budget. Towards the end of their accession talks, the EFTA4 (Austria,
Finland, Norway and Sweden) won a number of rule changes that reduced their
net contributions to a level well below what it would have been under status quo
rules.
The political economy approach would explain this example using the anticipated
voting power of the new entrants. Under EU rules, small countries are accorded far
more votes per citizen than are large countries, so despite their small populations the
entrants were projected to have almost one-sixth of Council votes.10 However,
politicians rarely exercise raw power without providing a good rationale. In this
case, the new entrants claimed that the pre-1995 rules were not designed to deal
with their structural problems: namely, low population density in remote regions.
The EU agreed, and the rules were changed. Of course, the same could be said a
fortiori about the CEECs. Existing EU rules are not designed to address the problems
of very poor countries (the World Bank classies Poland and the Czech Republic in
the same income group as Tunisia and Panama), nor are they designed for the
problems of economies in transition. Clearly, eastern enlargement will bring
pressure to change the rules, and the EU has shown a willingness to invent new ways
of providing structural funds to entrants.
The Iberian enlargement. The third example concerns the impact of the Iberian
enlargement on structural spending. This has several illuminating aspects, some of
which involve changes in spending levels and some of which involve changes in
spending rules. The EU has always had poor regions (southern Italy, for example),
but regions do not vote in the Council of Ministers. Since the 1974 accession of
Ireland and that of Greece in 1981, the EU has had poor members. While these two
entrants boosted structural spending, the changes were marginal. Big changes,
however, accompanied the 1986 Iberian enlargement.
First, a group of incumbents (Greece, France and Italy) demanded special budget
allocations in return for accepting the Iberians, the rationale being that the Iberians
southern agriculture was a threat to the Mediterranean incumbents. The result was
the Integrated Mediterranean Programme. This created 37-year projects that cost
about ECU6.6 billion, according to Allen (1996). A second, much larger change
was the doubling of structural spending that accompanied the ratication of the
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10 Norway did not join, so the new entrants have 12.6% of Council votes with 5.8% of the EU15 population.
Single European Act in mid-1987.11 Figure 8 provides some statistical evidence for
the political economy approach by showing that there is a remarkable correlation
between the spending on poor regions and the share of poor country votes in the
Council. In fact, not only are the trends the same, but the levels of the two indices
coincide pretty closely. A second remarkable feature is the way in which structural
spending gains seem to squeeze down the CAPs spending share. While this
winlose relationship is an algebraic inevitability, given the dominance of the two
items in the EU budget, it also reects the realities of power politics.
Why did the 1986 enlargement change so much when the Irish and Greek
accessions changed so little? Voting power provides one possible answer. Ireland had
only 3 of 58 votes, Ireland and Greece together had only 8 of 63 votes, but the
Iberian accession gave 21 of the 76 Council votes to the poor-4. Because this was
only two votes shy of a blocking coalition, the Iberian enlargement constituted a
major shift in the distribution of power. Not surprisingly, this led to a major
reorientation in budget priorities.
Further instructive aspects of the Iberian accession involve two landmark budget
agreements. In 1988, EU leaders agreed to limit the growth of CAP spending, and
they set an upper bound on the EU budget as a percentage of GDP. The political
economy approach would point to the newly powerful coalition of poor countries as
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11 The Council adopted the SEA treaty in 1986, but it was not ratied by all member states until mid-1987.
Figure 8. Voting power and spending shares, 195894
Sources:  EC (1994a) and own calculations.
the deep force behind these changes. The CAP is the Structural Funds major
competitor for EU cash, so anything that reduces CAP spending tends to free up
moneys for the poor-4. The budget ceiling can likewise be explained. The jump in
Structural Funds spending fundamentally changed the nature of the EU budget.
Before the Iberians joined, CAP spending routinely accounted for 70% or more of
the budget (see Figure 9) and, roughly speaking, the cost of the CAP dictated the
size of the overall budget and national contributions. In those days, one could say
that the EU budget was essentially a way of allowing rich northern European
nations to subsidize each others farmers. After the Iberians, the budget threatened
to become a vehicle for massive international income redistribution. While the
budget cap had many effects, an important one was to rule out the possibility that
structural spending would dictate national contributions in the same way that CAP
spending had in the 1970s and 1980s.
The nal illuminating aspect of the Iberian enlargement is the Cohesion Fund.
This was a new channel for structural spending explicitly separated from the usual
Objectives approach. At the Edinburgh summit in December 1992, EU leaders
created the Cohesion Fund and crafted the eligibility criteria to ensure that only the
poor-4 qualied. Some observers (e.g., Allen, 1996) claim that the poor-4 used their
veto power over the Maastricht Treaty as a lever to get the Cohesion Fund
(although the former preceded the latter by a year). A rosier interpretation is that
the rich EU countries thought that the Cohesion Fund was necessary to help the
poor-4 adjust to the changes embodied in economic and monetary union.
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Figure 9. EU spending, 195894 (ECUm)
Source:  EC (1994a).
Whichever interpretation is correct, creation of the Cohesion Fund provides further
evidence that we cannot take pre-enlargement spending rules as indicative of future
spending. New entrants can and have used their power as members to boost EU
structural spending in their nations by changing the level of spending and by
changing eligibility criteria. Why should the CEECs be any different?
Shifting CAP coverage. CAP price oors are not applied to all EU farm products.
Wheat prices, for instance, have always been controlled, while poultry prices have
never been. The last ten years, however, have seen the CAP extended to many new
products, especially to fruit and vegetables. What explains the extension of CAP
coverage? Imagine the EU9 farm ministers sitting around a table in 1980, trying to
decide which types of food deserve price support. Since German, French, British,
Irish, Belgian, Dutch and Danish farmers all focus on temperate products (e.g.,
dairy, meat and cereals), the EU9 decided to spend the CAPs billions on temperate
products. Fruit and vegetable farmers in Italy and southern France did not,
apparently, need price oors. Now imagine the same decision taken by the EU12
farm ministers in 1990. Recalling that fruit and vegetables are the mainstay of
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish farms, it is not surprising that the EU12 farm
ministers concluded that fruit and vegetable farmers did deserve CAP funds after
all. The price of tomatoes, however, can hardly be cast as a matter of vital national
interest in the manner of, say, the UK rebate. Consequently, one would not expect
the new entrants to make a big issue of it.
Instead, the new entrants gradually used their voting power to reorient CAP
spending priorities. Figure 10 shows the results. It plots the growth of CAP spending
for the EU12, Greece, Spain and Portugal from 1988 to 1994 (the most recent year
available). CAP spending for the EU as a whole rose by 40% during this period.
Portugal managed to increase CAP spending on Portuguese farmers by about
340%. Note that the 1994 level of Portugals receipts per farmer is still low 
ECU1500 versus ECU5600 for the average EU12 farmer. Spain and Greece
managed similar albeit less spectacular above-average increases. Interestingly,
Irelands CAP receipts (not shown) rose at about the EU12 average, possibly
reecting the fact that they had already exploited their political power to its fullest
by 1988. The countries with below-average receipts are the Netherlands, France,
Germany and Denmark (not shown).
4.3.3. An econometric analysis of voting power and budgets. The political
economy approach suggests that governments will use their voting power to affect
the net nancial contribution to the EU. Member states with lots of power per
citizen should get lots of benets per citizen, and since someone has to pay for this,
citizens living in countries with few votes per citizen should be net contributors. The
data in Table 12 show that there is indeed a close correlation between power and
net receipts. While it is tempting to lump net contributions and net receipts together,
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Figure 10. Growth in CAP receipts, 198894
Source:  EC Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the Community, various issues.
Table 12. Data for power politics model of EU budget
GNP/ Population Council 1994 1993
population (m) votes
Receipts Contributions Receipts Contributions
Belgium 19 640 10.0 5 2512.8 2820.2 2454.5 2451.4
Denmark 19 560 5.1 3 1495.1 1307.0 1583.4 1174.8
Germany 16 850 79.1 10 7729.2 21 563.3 7246.1 19 006.4
Greece 9000 10.3 5 4844.2 1031.6 5147.9 877.1
Spain 13 510 39.0 8 7834.7 4828.7 8263.0 5419.4
France 19 000 56.2 10 9924.5 12 725.5 10 525.9 11 884.7
Ireland 13 490 3.5 3 2390.9 664.0 2939.3 554.8
Italy 17 830 57.5 10 5219.2 8024.9 8739.6 11 020.1
Luxembourg 37 320 0.3 2 419.1 169.3 356.6 139.8
Netherlands 17 330 14.9 5 2416.0 4227.1 2704.0 4108.0
Portugal 10 710 10.0 5 3042.6 1161.7 3418.0 1067.5
UK 17 210 57.2 10 5258.6 6844.0 4500.8 7685.7
Misc. 7217.7 6328.6
Total 60 304.6 65 367.3 64 207.7 65 389.7
Notes:  See Court of Auditors p. 10 for Contribution (estimated), p. 54 for actual, p. 17 for unallocd Misc.
GNP/population and population from World Bank Development Report (1995), table 30 and table 1.
Source:  Budget data from EU Court of Auditors, Annual Reports on 1993 and on 1994.
discussion of the budget and spending procedures suggests that, as we look for
measurable links with power, it is preferable to separate out contributions and
receipts.
Results of regression analysis are presented in Table 13. The political economy
approach suggests that the power of a coalition with a common purpose tends to
exceed the sum of the power of the coalition members. This applies well to the poor-
4, which have somehow managed to get more cash, as can be seen from the
signicance of the cohesion variable, a dummy for these four countries (which is
interacted with the power variable to measure the slope effect). The two rst rows of
Table 13 present two specications for the receipts-per-capita regression, using
different measures of power: votes per capita and the SSI index discussed above.
The per capita SSI measure of power works best (it gives a higher R2). Both
explanatory variables are signicant and of the expected sign. Inspection of the data
in Table 12 reveals Luxembourg to be an outlier. To ensure that the results are not
driven by a single data point, we show in the third row the regression without
Luxembourg. The results reject the idea that Luxembourg is driving our ndings.
The signs and general orders of magnitude of the estimated coefcients are the same
with and without Luxembourg, although the goodness-of-t statistic (R2) is slightly
lower and the t-statistics are much lower, but still above the standard cut-off value.
The discussion above suggests that the rules for national contributions are fairly
simple and rigid. While power politics surely inuenced these rules, their rigid form
allows much less room for the sort of horse trading that the ShapleyShubik power
index brings to mind. The rules on expenditure, however, are massively complex
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Table 13. Power politics in the EU budget
Constant Votes per SSI/pop. Cohesion R2
capita No. of observations
Receipts per capita 107.9 178.2 511.8 0.95
19934 (18.8) (9.2) 24
Receipts per capita 31 375.8 259.2 0.97
19934 (23.4) (7.5) 24
Receipts per capita 43.5 336.8 282.6 0.93
19934 (5.7) (6.1) 22
w/o Luxembourg
Constant GDP per R2
capita No. of observations
Contribution per capita 9.6 0.012 0.86
1993 (7.8) 12
Notes: t-statistics in brackets. Cohesion is a slope dummy variable for the poor-4 EU countries.
Sources:  SSI is the ShapleySubik index of power computed by Kirman and WidgrÑen (1995); votes are
from Baldwin (1994); GNP per capita from World Bank Development Report, 1995; receipts and
contributions from EU Court of Auditors (1995).
and continuously changing. To take account of these facts, we examine whether the
contributions per citizen can be well explained by a constant and per capita GNP
only. The last row of Table 13 shows that the t is quite good and the income
variable is positive and signicant. We did explore alternative specications. For
instance, we tried including a cohesion country dummy, but the estimated
coefcient turned out insignicant and slightly negative. For completeness we also
regressed per capita contributions on the power index based on the SSI. This yields
a positive and signicant relationship, but we suspect that this arises from a spurious
correlation between very powerful countries and very rich countries (e.g.,
Luxembourg and Denmark). Indeed, the relationship is not robust to the exclusion
of Luxembourg.
4.3.4. Budget projections. We next use rows 1 or 2 and 4 to project the budget
impact of the Visegrad enlargement (here we include Slovenia with the original
Visegrad-4). Before proceeding, however, we note two important caveats. First, our
regressions are based on the 19934 budget, yet the EU is already committed to a
large increase in spending. Specically, the long-term budget plan agreed at the
Edinburgh Council of December 1992 foresees an increase of 37% in structural
spending between 1994 and 1999 (paid for primarily by a rise in the budget from
1.2% of EU GNP to 1.27% of GNP). Thus unless there is a radical change in the
EU, the CEECs will be able to exercise their voting power on a much larger pie.
The Edinburgh deal shows that the estimated coefcient on the cohesion country
dummy understates the power of the poor-4. Using this coefcient to project
Visegrad receipts therefore underestimates receipts. The second caveat is that the
power of the poor country coalition will experience a qualitative change. The poor-4
will become the poor-9. The combined votes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia will account for over
40% of the 112 Council votes in the EU20. Thus even a subset of the poor-9 will
have a blocking minority. The implications of this must be tempered with the
acknowledgement that the new poor-5 may be divided between boosting CAP
spending and boosting structural spending, since they are heavily agricultural as well
as poor.
Assuming that the year of entry is 2002, we present budget projections in Table
14. All CEECs are treated as cohesion countries. The rst three columns list results
obtained with the SSI power measure; the total Visegrad net receipts are equal to
about ECU9 billion. The next three columns show the projections using the vote-
based power measure and provide a much higher estimate of net costs, about
ECU18 billion. (Since the contribution projections do not depend upon the power
measure, the difference depends entirely on receipts. The fundamental difference
lies in the coefcient on the cohesion country dummy. Since the votes-per-capita
measure assigns enormous power to small countries, the regression scales down the
effect of power and corrects by raising the coefcient on the slope dummy for poor
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countries. Thus the total coefcient on power in the votes-based regression is to
predict a per capita receipt of ECU690 per unit of power. For the SSI-based
measure the total is only ECU635.)
The similarity between these estimates and the consensus estimate in the previous
section is striking. In fact, we nd it surprising, since we initially thought that the
power politics approach would yield much higher numbers. The mechanics behind
the programme-based estimates were explained above. Here we provide some
intuition for the power politics approach. The model posits a close correlation
between votes per citizen and receipts per citizen, with some adjustment for
countries that are part of the poor country coalition. Given that EU rules assign
votes according to population, Poland and Spain will get the same number of votes,
since they each have about 40 million citizens; the Czech Republic and Hungary
will get as many as Greece and Portugal (all four have populations of about
10 million); and the Slovak Republic will get one more than Ireland (populations 5.2
and 3.5 million respectively). Slovenia is not much more than half as large as
Ireland. Thus the receipts of the new poor-5 should be slightly higher than those of
the old poor-4. The new poor-5, however, will be substantially poorer, so they will
pay less in contributions. In 1994 the incumbent poor-4 got ECU17 billion in
receipts and paid ECU7.5 billion in contributions. It is easy to see, therefore, that
the projected net ECU15 billion for the Visegrad group is sensible   provided, of
course, that one believes that power politics dictate the EU receipts.
Finally, although we do not have estimates of the gains from including the Baltic
states, it is simple to project the budget impact of admitting all ten CEECs. Of
course, each time the list of members is altered, all the SSI power measures shift
(including for incumbents). What Table 15 shows is the projected cost using the SSI
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Table 14. Budget projections using the power politics view (Visegrad-5
enlargement in 2002)
Using SSI power measure Using vote-based power measure
Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected
receipts contribution net receipts contribution net
(ECUbn) (ECUbn) (ECUbn) (ECUbn) (ECUbn) (ECUbn)
Czech Republic 3.1 1.4 1.7 4.6 1.4 3.2
Hungary 3.1 1.1 2.0 4.6 1.1 3.5
Poland 5.8 3.2 2.5 9.6 3.2 6.4
Slovak Republic 2.4 0.6 1.8 3.3 0.6 2.8
Slovenia 1.7 0.4 1.3 2.3 0.4 1.9
Visegrad-5 16.1 6.7 9.4 24.4 6.7 17.7
Note:  Enlargement assumed to occur in 2002, with the Visegrad-5 assumed to grow at 5% per annum
between 1993 and 2002.
Sources:  Baldwin (1994) for votes, World Bank Development Report, 1995 for GNP/pop., Kirman and
WidgrÑen (1995) for SSI index (EU20); NB per capita SSI times 100.
values calculated for the EU25: that is, the incumbent fteen plus ten CEECs (these
SSI gures are taken from Kirman and WidgrÑen (1995), who unfortunately do not
consider membership for Cyprus and Malta). As the last column of the table shows,
the projected budget costs are only ECU3.5 billion for the Baltic republics (less than
ECU1 billion for Estonia alone).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper estimates the long-run economic benets and budgetary costs of eastern
enlargement under two scenarios. The rst views membership for the CEECs as
entailing only the standard elements (single market access and the common external
tariff). The second additionally assumes that membership promotes CEEC
investment by substantially lowering their country-risk premia. Under both
scenarios, the incumbent EU15 are projected to gain about ECU10 billion in real
income. This gain, however, is likely to be very unevenly distributed. Using a back-
of-the-envelope procedure, we estimate that Germany, France and the UK would
together get about two-thirds of the total gain (Germany alone accounts for about a
third of the total gain).
The budget costs are calculated using two very different approaches. The rst is
based on a survey of the literature estimating likely CAP and cohesion receipts, and
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Table 15. Budget projections using power politics
view (enlargements to EU25 in 2002)
Using SSI power measure
Projected Projected Projected
receipts contribution net
(ECUbn) (ECUbn) (ECUbn)
Czech Republic 2.74 1.38 1.4
Hungary 2.74 1.10 1.6
Poland 5.12 3.22 1.9
Slovak Republic 2.07 0.58 1.5
Slovenia 1.46 0.40 1.1
Bulgaria 2.18 0.60 1.6
Romania 3.63 0.98 2.6
Balkan-2 5.8 1.6 4.2
Estonia 1.00 0.20 0.8
Latvia 1.48 0.22 1.3
Lithuania 1.51 0.18 1.3
Baltic-3 4.0 0.6 3.4
CEEC7 19.9 8.3 11.7
CEEC10 23.9 8.9 15.1
Source:  Authors calculations.
a rough guess at the CEECs contributions to the EU budget. We arrive at a
consensus estimate of a net cost of ECU23 billion for a Visegrad enlargement in
2000. The second approach is exclusively based on power politics (members
receipts are related to their voting power in the Council of Ministers and per capita
national contributions are related to per capita income) and arrives at an estimate of
ECU1018 billion, remarkably, and unexpectedly, similar to the rst gure.
5.1. Its a bargain
Eastern enlargement will be a phenomenally good bargain for the incumbent EU15.
Sweeping aside questions about the timing of the benets and budget costs, and the
list of countries in the rst enlargement, the net costs   transfers less benets 
should be somewhere between zero and ECU8 billion. Even the upper bound of this
range is something like 0.01% of the EU15s GDP. This is an extraordinarily low
cost given the historic nature of the challenge in central Europe. Imagine how eager
western Europe would have been in 1980 to pay ECU8 billion a year in order to
free central Europe from communism and remove Soviet troops from the region.
Eastern enlargement is not really about transfers and narrowly dened economic
benets. Eastern enlargement is an essential pillar in Europes post-Cold War
architecture. Moreover, imagine that we had done the same economic cost versus
budget transfers calculation for Luxembourg and Denmark. Given the massive per
capita subsidies they receive and the small size of their economies, we would almost
certainly have found that the EU would gain on narrow economic grounds from
expelling Luxembourg and Denmark! Of course, no one would suggest that such a
move would benet the EU, since the Unions primary purpose is to ensure peace
and stability in Europe. Economic integration is the means, not the end.
5.2. Who pays the extra budget costs?
This grand conclusion is the bottom line of our paper. Nevertheless, someone will
have to pay the budget transfers, if the enlargement is to happen. This brings us
from the stratosphere of high politics back down to the nitty-gritty of low politics.
Table 16 explores three ways of sharing out the transfers, taking ECU20 billion as a
rounded-off estimate of the extra budget costs. The rst column assumes that it is
spread out according to the incumbent EU15s contribution shares in 1994. The big-
4 (Germany, France, Italy and the UK), which are by far the largest contributors,
kick in about ECU11 billion; Germany alone pays 30% of the total. The second
column exempts the poor-4 (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) from any
increase. The results are broadly similar, with the obvious difference that all the
rich-11 pay a little more. The third column uses our rough estimates of member
states share of the economic gains to apportion the ECU15 billion. Again the
numbers are not too different. Germanys share rises to 36% compared to 31%
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under the straight-line rule; French and UK shares also rise substantially. Impor-
tantly, Portugal gets a rebate and Greece pays virtually nothing. Under the pro rata
scheme, Italy pays ECU1 billion less than it does under the straight-line scheme.
5.3. Gains to the CEECs
Our estimates project that EU membership will be enormously benecial to the
CEEC economies. Even without considering transfers, and even limiting ourselves
to the conservative scenarios, membership will raise CEEC real incomes by 1992
ECU2.5 billion. Our less conservative estimate, which presumes that membership
will have an important impact on the CEECs country risk, projects very large gains
of 1992 ECU30 billion. Adding in farm and Structural Funds transfers, the gure
rises to about ECU23 billion for the conservative estimate and ECU50 billion for
the less conservative estimates. Of course, our simulation model projects long-run
gains, so these extra billions would not be added to CEEC real incomes
immediately.
The importance of EU membership to the CEECs, however, is greatly
understated by these calculations. A good deal of the progress in the central
European transitions has been driven by the prospect of an early eastern enlarge-
ment. For instance, the need to meet the Copenhagen membership criteria and
adopt the EUs acquis has helped all central European governments to resist special
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Table 16. Possible distributions of extra budget costs (ECUbn
extra contributions to EU budget)
Straight line Straight line Gains
without poor-4 share
paying extra pro rata
(from Table 6)
Germany 6.2 7.0 6.8
France 3.7 4.1 3.9
UK 2.0 2.2 2.8
Italy 2.3 2.6 1.7
Spain 1.4 0.0 1.4
Netherlands 1.2 1.4 0.9
Sweden 0.5 0.5 0.8
BelgiumLuxembourg 0.9 1.0 0.5
Austria 0.5 0.6 0.5
Denmark 0.4 0.4 0.4
Finland 0.3 0.3 0.3
Greece 0.3 0.0 0.1
Ireland 0.2 0.0 0.1
Portugal 0.3 0.0 0.1
EU15 20 20 20
Note:  1994 contributions for Austria, Sweden and Finland calculated with
contributions/population regression from Table 14.
Source:  Authors calculations (see text for methodology).
interest calls for bad policy. Thus one should probably assign to the prospect of EU
membership a good deal of the recent growth experienced in the region. Although
the example involves a chicken-and-egg problem, it is worth noting that the CEECs
that are keenest on early EU membership are the ones that have pushed forward
their transitions the fastest. Delaying accession negotiations could have very negative
effects on the CEEC economies and societies.
Discussion
Dani Rodrik
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
This is an interesting paper, admirable in its attempt to quantify what many policy-
makers would consider unquantiable. Its bottom line is that extending membership
in the EU to the central and eastern European countries in transition (CEECs)
would be a bargain for the EU, and a great boon for the CEECs themselves. I have
little to say regarding the discussion of the budgetary implications of enlargement, as
I am not familiar with the intricacies of the EU budget. My sense, however, is that
the authors exaggerate the economic benets of enlargement   wildly so in the case
of the CEECs  and ignore some of its costs.
Welfare effects of the decline in risk premium
I think the authors are right in saying that the main economic advantage of EU
membership is a potential improvement in the investment climate of the CEECs.
They model this effect as a decline in the risk premium faced by these countries,
which is also plausible. But their bottom line greatly overstates the economic benets
to the CEECs, even if we accept their assumption of a sizeable decline in the risk
premium. The authors calculate that, under their assumption of a 30% reduction in
the required rate of return to capital in the CEECs, due to a fall in the risk premium
subsequent to EU entry, the real income of the seven CEECs will rise by
ECU30 billion (or 18.8%). This is indeed enormous by the standards of computable
general equilibrium models. Nowhere do the authors mention, however, that this is
a number that has very little economic meaning. This 18.8% represents the
increment in real income in the steady state, largely due to an expanded capital stock.
The gure does not take into account the opportunity cost of the investments that
had to be undertaken in the transition to the steady state in order to enlarge the capital
stock. A simple analogy will help clarify the situation. Suppose Poland were to invest
99% of its income for the next ten years. At the end of the ten-year period, Poland
would have a capital stock that is much larger than it would have been otherwise,
and consequently its real income from that point on would be greatly enhanced.
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Should we then recommend that Poland follow this strategy and squeeze its
consumption down to 1% of its income for the next ten years? Of course not. The
eventual gains have to be traded off against the consumption losses incurred in the
transition. What we need to calculate, therefore, is the welfare benets of the
reduction in the risk premium  that is, the increase in present and future
consumption possibilities generated by the reduction in the risk premium  rather
than the income gains in the very long run.
There is a simple way of doing this, shown in Figure 11. Let the downward-
sloping VMPK schedule represent the demand for the domestic capital stock in the
CEECs. Let r* represent the opportunity cost of capital, which we can assume to be
the risk-free rate. (There are some complications here, but they are secondary for
my purposes.) Let r stand for the risk premium for the CEECs. Following EU entry,
the risk premium falls from r to r, , and the capital stock increases (in the long run)
from K0  to K1. The welfare gain here is the sum of the areas A and B, which can be
expressed as DW = ‰( r + r, ) (K1  K0 ). Expressing this quantity in terms of national
income (Y ), DW/Y = ‰( r + r, )[(K1  K0 )/K0 ](K0 /Y ). Hence we need three
numbers to approximate the true welfare effect of the reduction in the risk premium:
the average of the pre- and post-risk premia for CEECs, the percentage increase in
the capital stock, and the capitaloutput ratio. The rst of these numbers is no
larger than 0.04 (it is hard to be completely clear from the discussion in the paper).
For the second, I take the authors result of 68% (leaving aside the question of
whether the implied elasticity for capital is not too large). For the capitaloutput
ratio, I substitute the Singapore gure for 1970 (1.4), which is likely to be an
overestimate. Even with these generous assumptions, the result is an increase in
welfare of 3.8%, which is only a fraction of the 18.8% gure presented in the paper.
Figure 11 also claries the nature of the exercise carried out by the authors, and
why it is misleading. The increase in national income in the long run is simply the
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Figure 11. The welfare effect of the reduction in the risk premium
increment in national output due to the enlarged capital stock. This can be
calculated as DY/Y = ( r* + r)[(K1  K0 )/Y] = [( r* + r)K0 /Y] [(K1  K0 )/K0 ] =
a[(K1  K0 )/K0 ], where a denotes the factor share of capital in national income.
Assuming a is 0.30, we get DY/Y = (0.3)(0.68) = 20.4%, which is close to the
authors 18.8%. But note that this represents the sum of areas A, B and C in Figure
11. It does not have a meaningful economic interpretation as a guide to policy
choice unless we are prepared to assume that the opportunity cost of capital ( r*) is
near zero! Even leaving this point aside, there is the issue of discounting. The
calculated gains are those that accrue in the steady state, which is in fact never
reached. The gures need to be expressed in present-discounted value terms, which
requires that these gains be calculated for some suitable neighbourhood of the steady
state and then discounted back to the present.
Further issues related to CEECs
I said above that the main economic advantage of EU membership is a potential
improvement in the investment climate of the CEECs. The authors downplay any
doubts about this potential being fullled, including their own rather inconclusive
before-and-after comparisons. There are two questions here: (1) Is it reasonable to
expect the risk premium to fall in all of the CEECs, and if so, to fall by the full
amount that the authors have assumed? (2) If the answer to (1) is yes, is it reasonable
to expect the capital stock to rise by as much as 68%? On the rst question, I would
have liked to see the authors think harder about what makes some countries (e.g.,
Portugal?) take full advantage of the opportunities presented by EU membership,
while others (Greece?) use the opportunity to engage in patronage politics. The
evidence is that the improvement in the investment climate does not come
automatically; it is contingent on the choices made by domestic political authorities.
The availability of additional resources from Brussels, in particular, can have
deleterious effects on governance (as it seems to have had in Greece, for example).
On the second question, one would have liked to see some numbers on what the
simulations imply for things like the share of foreign ownership in the domestic
economy, prot remittances as a share of GNP, the long-run trade balance, and the
long-run debt and capitaloutput ratios. These would give us a sense of whether
the implied path is a sensible one, consistent with cross-country evidence.
Political and bureaucratic costs of enlargement for the EU
The authors probably underestimate these costs. With a substantial expansion of
membership, the EU bureaucratic machinery is likely to become even more
unwieldy. (Think, for example, of the added cost of preparing translations of all EU
documents in seven new languages.) Reaching decisions on a unanimous or
qualied-majority basis is likely to become more difcult. Furthermore, the greater
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diversity of needs and preferences within the EU is likely to make the single market
and EMU more problematic throughout. Political and bureaucratic gridlock in an
enlarged EU is a real danger that should be taken seriously.
To sum up, the paper greatly exaggerates the real economic benets that will
accrue to CEECs from EU membership, even under the papers own assumptions
about likely future scenarios. Furthermore, these gains are contingent on correct
policies being followed by the new members, which is something that cannot be
taken for granted, especially since we do not always know what these correct
policies are. Finally, the bureaucratic/political costs of enlargement are likely to be
larger than the authors indicate. For all these reasons, the paper has not moved
much my priors about the desirability of EU enlargement.
IstvÑan P. SzÑekely
National Bank of Hungary and Budapest University of Economics
This is an excellent paper which applies a wide variety of methods to come to
sensible estimates. What is really surprising is that different methods lead to
remarkably similar conclusions. It is also remarkable how little attention is paid to
the costs and benets of enlargement within CEECs, and a telling fact that the
authors could not nd estimates to refer to. Hopefully, this paper will help
politicians and economic policy-makers in the CEECs to understand the importance
of this issue.
As the authors themselves point out, enlargement is not only about transfers and
narrowly dened economic benets. Eastern enlargement is an essential pillar in
Europes post-Cold War architecture. That is, the decisions about enlargement will
probably be political. Yet, economic issues will be very much part of the picture.
Economic costs and benets will bear on decisions, particularly on the details. As we
know, the devil lives in the detail. According to this paper, an overwhelming
proportion of the benets for the CEECs come from two sources: own-liberalization
of trade and generally sound policies which reduce the country risk premium. In
principle, both types of policy could be achieved without EU membership.
However, the authors note that the desire for, and realistic chances of, EU
membership serve as powerful commitment and prevention devices as they limit the
power of lobbies with conicting entrenched interests. The prospect of membership
increases the likelihood and credibility of sound macroeconomic policies and
structural reforms. Once more, the political economy turns out to be crucially
important.
What is missing in the debate is the alternative: no enlargement and its own costs.
Yet no enlargement at all does not seem a realistic option. More relevant is how to
dene the right group for the rst wave of entrants, and how to time this rst wave.
The paper struggles with the rst issue, but does not say anything about the second.
This is not surprising, since the authors approach is geared towards the long run.
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Yet, they end up somewhat unclear about which countries they regard as adequate
rst-wave entrants. Sometimes they seem to favour the Visegrad-4, at other times it
is the Visegrad-5 (that is, adding Slovenia to the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Hungary and Poland), while occasionally Estonia appears as the front-runner. And
yet they never attempt to link their list to the costs and benets that they provide.
Could it be that political considerations are completely overwhelming in the choice
of timing?
In the event that the (political) decision of enlargement (selection of countries,
timing, conditions, etc.) is perceived by the nancial markets as economically
unsound, the EU15 might pay a penalty in the form of a risk premium. This issue is
overlooked in the paper. Of course, the premium would be much smaller than the
current one affecting the CEECs. Yet, given the size of the EU15 economies, the
economic effect could be large.
General discussion
Patrick Rey felt that the analysis, while claiming to be about the costs and benets of
eastern enlargement, had focused primarily on the benets. Though the authors
have found the net cost of enlargement to be quite small, it is noteworthy that this
emerged as the difference of two magnitudes that were themselves quite small. He
urged them to do more work on the cost side of the analysis. Likewise, AndrÑe Sapir
was not persuaded that the cost of enlargement is small. While the estimated net cost
 about ECU15 billion  seems small in relation to the total GDP of the EU (about
ECU6000 billion), it represents a signicant chunk of the EU budget of about
ECU60 billion. Where would the required funds come from, given that the current
EU members lack the political will to increase their contribution by an average of
0.25% of their GDP? Such a signicant amount cannot be simply released by a
reallocation of the existing budget. Furthermore, contributions are hard to measure.
For instance, the Netherlands net contribution to the EU is hard to measure
because of the so-called Rotterdam effect: as a major port of entry, Rotterdam
collects a considerable amount of tariff revenue on goods entering the EU.
Barry Eichengreen felt that the paper misses some important elements of the
relationship between the EU and eastern Europe, both now and after enlargement.
First, foreign direct investment, unlike portfolio investment, tends to concentrate on
particular sectors and particular countries. In particular, 60% of the FDI to eastern
Europe has gone to just one country, Hungary. Second, the simulations do not take
into account the fact that a lot of the exports from eastern Europe to the EU are in
the low-wage, low-value-added category. For instance, 70% of the Romanian
exports to the EU are of the kind where they import sleeves and collars and export
shirts. This is signicant because such production activity contributes little in the
way of learning effects and productivity improvements, and the spillover effects that
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one hopes for are often missing. Third, the analysis neglects the implications of
enlargement for the issue of labour mobility.
Willem Buiter concurred that labour mobility is an important issue. Given the
wage and human capital differentials between the east and the west, one would
expect massive migration ows. He also took issue with the hope that enlargement
will lead to the liberalization of goods markets in eastern Europe. In a number of
sectors, especially agriculture, accession to the EU will probably lead to the
deliberalization of markets. Finally, he advocated caution in the use of country risk
indices when considering risk premia for investment. Country risk measures are
single country measures and, as such, not entirely appropriate to the riskreturn
relationship, say, in the capital asset pricing model.
Vidar Christiansen called for more discussion of the political economy aspects of
enlargement. In particular, when discussing the role of new members in the
decision-making process, it is important to distinguish between their pre-entry and
post-entry positions. For instance, while some Nordic members of the EU were
persuaded to join by the carrot of nancial support for their remote regions, such
incentives are probably unnecessary for eastern European countries. For Bruno
Frey, the essential question was: how will integration affect the huge, and largely
unproductive, public sector in these countries? Clearly, the simulation is unable to
capture questions of this sort. He conjectured that integration would be benecial to
both the east and the west if it induced more political competition within these
countries.
In response to the comments, Richard Baldwin argued that CGE models are
typically unable to capture FDI, except through trade. Responding to Willem
Buiters point of the danger of increased protection, he argued that eastern Europe is
more protected than the EU except in agriculture. On the issue of labour mobility,
Richard Portes felt that there will be a long transition period before full labour
mobility is allowed, and by that time the wage differentials will not be so signicant.
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